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 In 2017, the State of Wisconsin agreed to provide Foxconn with almost $3 billion in state 
incentives, for a flatscreen manufacturing facility in Southeast Wisconsin. The originally-
planned facility was to involve a $10 billion investment, and 13,000 jobs at reported average 
salary of $53,875. Since then, the project has been significantly revised. The currently-planned 
Foxconn facility is reported to involve a $2 billion investment, and 1,500 to 1,800 jobs. Still to 
be determined is exactly what incentives Wisconsin will provide for the revised facility. One 
possible option is to continue the original incentive offer, but scaled back to reflect the lower 
amount of jobs and investment.  
 This memo analyzes the costs and benefits of a revised Foxconn deal that is some scaled 
back version of the original Foxconn deal. In other words, the analysis here is of a possible new 
state contract with Foxconn, but one that follows the credit rates of the original deal. Why 
analyze a possible new contract? Because given that the Foxconn project has been significantly 
revised, a new contract seems likely. Why not analyze what a scaled-back Foxconn project might 
receive in incentives under the original contract? Because under the original contract, there are 
many goals and timetables, and many scenarios for possible clawbacks; it is difficult to project 
what might happen, legally and economically, under all these scenarios. What can be readily 
                                                 
1 This memo was written in response to a request from the Wisconsin Department of Administration, who 
asked for my assessment related to the costs and benefits of the evolving Foxconn project. However, neither I nor 
the Upjohn Institute was compensated for this project, and this memo was prepared independently and without 
review from the Department of Administration. The conclusions are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Upjohn Institute or the Wisconsin Department of Administration. 
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calculated are the implications of a new contract, that applies the current deal’s investment credit 
rates and job creation credit rates to a scaled-back Foxconn project.    
 As described in this memo, either the original Foxconn incentive, or scaled back versions 
of the original offer, are far greater than typical U.S. incentives. Depending upon the incentive 
offer’s details—and indeed the devil’s in the details—the Foxconn incentives per job, compared 
to the average investment/job credit offer by U.S. states, is 7 to 12 times greater. The present 
value of the Foxconn incentive offer, in 2019 dollars, per job, ranges from $172K per job to 
$290K per job under various scenarios. Average U.S. incentives are $24K per job.  Wisconsin 
incentive in the past have averaged $28K per job.  
 The Foxconn incentive offer is also greater per job than offers accepted by Amazon. The 
Amazon New York offer was, depending upon the ultimate job creation, between $31K and 
$46K per job. Virginia’s offer to Amazon was, contingent upon the ultimate size of this facility, 
between $10K and $13K per job.  
 Part of the details that matter are not only how many jobs are ultimately created by 
Foxconn, but what limits are imposed on the annual incentive payments. The original Foxconn 
incentive offer, although very large, did impose some annual limits and total caps that stretched 
out the incentive offer. These limits and caps ended up reducing somewhat the real present value 
of the incentive offer. In any revised offer, the details of whether the offer keeps the original 
annual and lifetime caps, or lowers them to reflect the reduced project scale, make a large 
difference. Imposing lower annual limits and lower lifetime caps could lower Foxconn costs per 
job by almost one-quarter, or by over $60K per job. 
 What do Wisconsin residents get in return for these incentives? What are the benefits, 
and what determines those benefits? In the original analysis of Foxconn done by the Legislative 
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Fiscal Bureau, the focus was on the state government’s fiscal benefits. The Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau concluded that the Foxconn project would not fiscally break even until 2042-43.  
 Even as a fiscal impact analysis, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau’s report is incomplete and 
overly optimistic. First, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau implicitly assumes a 100 percent 
probability that without the incentive, none of these 13,000 direct jobs would have been created 
by Foxconn, or by any substitute firm. Second, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau ignored the impact 
of job creation on population growth and the consequent needs for expanded public services. 
 As shown in this memo, under a realistic fiscal impact analysis, even if none of the 
Foxconn jobs would have been created without these incentives, fiscal benefits of Foxconn will 
never come close to offsetting the incentive costs. After accounting for population growth effects 
on public service needs, the present value of fiscal benefits is likely to offset no more than 20 
percent of the incentive costs.  
 Of course, the purpose of government, and specifically of government economic 
development programs, is not to make money for the government. The government is not in 
business to make a profit, but rather to advance its constituents’ well-being. If incentives such as 
Foxconn induce job growth, they can enhance residents’ well-being by increasing employment to 
population ratios (employment rates) and real wages. Offsetting these costs are possible negative 
effects of paying for the incentives. Foxconn’s incentives come out of the spending side of the 
state budget. Assuming that this results in cuts in various state spending programs, these 
spending cuts also have effects on the state economy. In particular, cuts in education spending 
can damage workers’ skills and state residents’ wages. 
 How do these various benefits and costs balance out? Using a model of how state 
economies operate, I analyze the benefits and costs of the revised Foxconn project under various 
4 
 
scenarios. I assume for this analysis that without the incentives, none of the 1,500 to 1,800 jobs 
at the revised project would have been created in the state. Under this assumption, the benefit-
cost ratio—here calculated as all benefits and costs other than incentives, divided by the 
incentive costs—range from 0.71 to minus 0.02. That is, it seems likely that the revised project 
has benefits less than costs.  
 This benefit-cost analysis is overly-optimistic in several respects. First, without the 
incentives, even if the Foxconn project disappeared, it seems likely that there would be some 
substitute job-creation for the 1,500 to 1,800 Foxconn jobs. The infrastructure, land, and labor 
that would have been tied up in the Foxconn project can be used in alternative ways. The number 
of substitute jobs is probably less than the 1,500 to 1,800 Foxconn jobs, but on the other hand 
more than zero.  
 Second, this analysis assumes that the employment rate effects of the revised Foxconn 
project will be similar to average job creation in a local economy. Yet some reports suggest that 
the revised Foxconn project will mostly stress jobs with very high skill requirements. Higher 
skill requirements are likely to reduce the proportion of jobs that go to non-employed state 
residents, and increase the proportion that go to in-migrants to the state.  
COST ANALYSIS 
 Analyzing the costs per job of the revised Foxconn project requires some assumptions 
about exactly how the original incentives will be scaled back. The original incentives were 
nominally a 17 percent wage credit for 15 years, and a 15 percent investment credit. However, 
the incentive agreement between the state of Wisconsin and Foxconn put various annual and 
lifetime limits on these incentives. In particular, the annual wage credit caps did not fully allow 
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for any inflation over time in wage rates. In addition, the investment credit had a lifetime cap that 
was 13.5 percent of the $10 billion planned investment, and also spread out the investment credit 
over seven years. The lack of full inflation adjustments to the wage credit, and the spreading out 
and lifetime cap to the investment credit, reduced somewhat the real present value of the 
incentives.  
 To deal with this, I calculate possible revised Foxconn incentives under four different 
scenarios. All scenarios assume $2 billion in investment. The scenarios differ along two 
dimensions. One dimension is whether the jobs created are 1,500, or 1,800. The other dimension 
is whether the limits in the original incentive offer are retained as written, or ratcheted down to 
reflect the reduced scale of the project. If the original limits are retained as is, then the wage 
credits would simply be awarded at 17 percent, and the investment credits at 15 percent, and the 
original limits would mostly not be binding on total incentives paid, which increases the amount 
of the incentive. If the original limits are ratcheted down to reflect the reduced project size, then 
these annual and lifetime caps would continue to reduce the value of the incentive. 
 I then calculate the present value of these incentives, in 2019 dollars. This present value 
assumes that the annual inflation rate between 2018 and 2034 will be 2 percent. In addition, I use 
a fairly standard social discount rate of 3 percent—that is, the same real dollar a year from now 
has a present value of 3 percent less this year. This real discount rate reflects that people place a 
somewhat higher value on dollar flows this year rather than many years from now.  
 For comparison, I also calculate the present value of incentives per job for other states’ 
jobs tax credits and investment tax credits. I calculate the present value of incentives offered to 
Amazon by New York, and to Amazon by Virginia. Amazon recently agreed to accept these 
states’ offers, although Amazon ultimately backed out of the New York deal, due perhaps in part 
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to political opposition. For both the New York and Virginia Amazon deals, I consider two 
scenarios, as both agreements have a phase one of 25,000 Amazon jobs, followed by a phase two 
that would involve up to 40,000 jobs in New York, and 37,850 jobs in Virginia.  
 I also calculate the average state jobs credits and investment tax credits per job from my 
2017 Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (Bartik, 2017). This database attempted to 
quantify the “usual deal” that state and local governments offer new facilities that they want to 
attract. That is, it includes deals commonly offered, and not one-of-a-kind deals such as Foxconn 
or Amazon. The particular data I use is the average incentive offered over all so-called “export-
base” industries as of 2015, the most recent year in my database. This deal is averaged over the 
32 states plus the District of Columbia included in the database. These geographic areas include 
over 90 percent of all U.S. economic output. In addition to reporting the output-weighted average 
over these 33 different areas of the present value of incentives per job, I also report the 
database’s estimate of Wisconsin’s “usual deal” as of 2015. 
 Table 1 reports these calculations’ results. (An appendix shows the year by year 
incentives in the Foxconn and Amazon scenarios.) As the Table shows, all the Foxconn deals are 
far greater than average U.S. deal, Wisconsin’s past practices, or the Amazon deals in New York 
or Virginia.  
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Table 1  Present value (2019 dollars) of costs of state job creation tax credits (JCTCs) and investment tax 
credits (ITCs) per job, various projects and state incentives, in thousands of dollars per job 
Project or state Description 
Total ITC + 
JCTC per 
job 
JCTC ITC 
Original Foxconn deal 13K jobs, $10B investment 172 82 90 
New Foxconn scenario, most optimistic 1,800 jobs, $2B investment, 
ratcheted down limits 
197 80 118 
New Foxconn scenario, middle  1,500 jobs, $2B investment, 
ratcheted down limits 
221 80 141 
New Foxconn scenario 1,800 jobs, $2B investment, keep old 
limits and use formulas 
260 112 148 
New Foxconn scenario, most pessimistic 1,500 jobs, $2B investment, keep old 
annual limits and use formulas 
290 112 178 
Amazon, NY, optimistic scenario 40K jobs 31 21 10 
Amazon, NY, pessimistic scenario 25K jobs 46 34 12 
Amazon, VA, optimistic scenario 37.85K jobs 10 10 0 
Amazon, VA, pessimistic scenario 25K jobs 13 13 0 
WI “usual deal,” 2015 Panel Data on Incentives and Taxes 28 15 12 
U.S. average “usual deal,” 2015 Panel Data on Incentives and Taxes 24 18 6 
Note: All present value calculations use annual discount rate of 3 percent. All figures are in thousands of present 
value 2018 dollars per job.  
 
 
 As shown, the “new” Foxconn deals tend to be greater in cost per job than the original 
deal. This is in part because the recent reports have a higher ratio of investment to jobs created, 
which raises the costs of the investment tax credits per job.  
 In addition, it makes a huge difference whether the new incentives for Foxconn keep the 
original annual and lifetime incentive limits—and then simply use the formulas for the 17 
percent wages tax credit and 15 percent investment tax credit—or whether these credit 
percentages are also limited by ratcheting down the original annual and lifetime caps. Comparing 
the two 1,800 jobs scenarios, ratcheting down the old limits reduces costs per job by $63K, from 
$260K to $197K. Comparing the two 1,500 jobs scenarios, ratcheting down the old limits 
reduces costs per job by $69K, from $290K to $221K.  
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BENEFITS ANALYSIS 
 To calculate the possible benefits of the revised Foxconn facility, I enter these four 
different incentive scenarios into my model of the benefits and costs of incentives for state 
residents and calculate the present value of various benefits and costs.  
 This incentive model is described more fully in Bartik (2018). But briefly, this is a model 
in which the incentives are assumed to have some effect on the probability of inducing a 
particular job-creation decision, with that assumed probability based either on the size of the 
incentives relative to the firm’s costs, or with that probability being assigned by the analyst. This 
job creation then has some assumed multiplier effects on other jobs, with the multiplier also 
being assigned by the analyst. The total job creation then has effects on local employment rates 
and wage rates, based on empirical studies of how job growth shocks affect these local labor 
market variables under various initial labor market conditions. The job creation also increases 
property values. The increased wages and property values have some negative effects on other 
job creation, and also reduce profits of some local business owners. The effects of local job 
creation on employment rates, employment to population ratios, immediately implies effects on 
local population growth. These job growth and population growth effects are used to calculate 
effects on state and local tax revenue, and state and local spending needs. The incentive costs, 
net of any fiscal benefits from revenue effects exceeding spending needs, must be paid for in 
some way, and this has economic costs. For example, any tax increase or spending cut has some 
negative demand side effects on a state’s economy. And the model allows for cuts in spending on 
K-12 education to have some long-run negative effects on state wages. The model follows a 
state’s economy for 80 years, to allow for the full impact of long-term effects due to education 
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cutbacks. All effects in later years are discounted back to the present, using a 3 percent real 
discount rate, so a dollar effect in year 80 is worth only less than ten cents in present dollars.  
 For this specific simulation, the baseline model is altered in the following ways: 
• The Foxconn incentive is assumed to be “decisive,” in that none of these jobs or any 
substitute jobs would locate in Wisconsin without the incentive. 
• The assumed input-output multiplier is 2.39, which is the more optimistic multiplier in 
the Baker and Tilly report on the Foxconn project. 
• The baseline unemployment rate is 2.8 percent, Wisconsin’s current unemployment rate. 
• The net cost of the incentives, minus any fiscal benefits, are assumed to come from 
reduced state and local public spending. Out of that reduced public spending, 21.7 
percent comes from reduced K-12 spending, based on Census of Governments data that 
this is the average share of state and local public spending in Wisconsin that goes to K-12 
schools.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the overall benefits and costs of the Foxconn incentives and job 
creation for Wisconsin residents, with various types of effects identified. As shown, the model 
includes not only estimated incentive costs, but various other benefits and costs. The other 
benefits and costs include fiscal benefits, labor market benefits due to higher employment rates, 
wage losses due to the education spending cutbacks, and effects on property values and local 
business profits. The ratio of all these other benefits and costs to incentive costs is calculated as 
the benefit-cost ratio. A benefit-cost ratio of greater than one is required for a project or policy to 
have net benefits. The benefits and costs are all calculated in present value dollars as of 2019.  
As the Table shows, net fiscal benefits are slight relative to incentive costs. Incentive 
costs range from $341 million to $482 million, and net fiscal benefits range from $55 million to 
$68 million. The Foxconn job creation, and the associated multiplier job creation, does generate 
considerable increases in state and local tax bases and hence tax revenue. However, over 90 
percent of this is offset by increased needs for public expenditure due to an expanded population. 
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Table 2  Costs, Benefits, and Benefit-Cost Ratios for Revised Foxconn Project, Various Scenarios 
Present value below in millions of 
2019 dollars of 
1,800 jobs, 
new limits 
1,500 jobs, 
new limits 
1,800 jobs, 
old limits 
1,500 jobs, 
old limits 
Incentive costs (366) (341) (482) (447)      
Increased state/local tax revenue 1,672 1,362 1,573 1,272 
Increased state/local public service 
needs 
(1,603) (1,306) (1,506) (1,217) 
Fiscal benefits = revenue − needs 68 56 67 55      
Labor market benefits (higher 
employment rate effects on earnings 
and wages) 
433 354 414 337 
     
Wage loss due to K-12 spending 
cutbacks 
(346) (338) (501) (479) 
     
Net other benefits (property value 
gains plus losses to local businesses 
due to higher costs) 
103 84 98 79 
     
Gross benefits (all effects except 
incentive costs) 
259 157 78 (8) 
     
Benefit-cost ratio (ratio of gross 
benefits to incentive costs)  
0.71 0.46 0.16 (0.02) 
Note: All figures except benefit-cost ratio are in millions of present value 2019 dollars, using 3 percent annual social 
discount rate. Figures in parentheses are negative numbers or costs.  
 
 
 The job creation resulting from Foxconn does increase employment rates, and this puts 
some upward pressure on Wisconsin wage rates. Countering that is that the cutbacks in K-12 
reduced wages. As it turns out, these two effects tend to be of similar size. The costs of the 
education cutbacks tend to dominate if the incentive costs are larger relative to job creation. The 
key point here is that net incentive costs are not just a dollar cost to the state government, but 
also potentially an economic cost to the state economy and state residents. 
The net ratio of other benefits and costs, to incentive costs, ranges from 0.71 to −0.02. In 
other words, in all four scenarios, the Foxconn project on net costs more than its benefits. 
However, in the most optimistic scenario, the net losses due to the Foxconn incentives are only 
29 percent (100% − 71%) of the incentive costs. The project does produce some significant 
benefits for state residents in this scenario, just not as much as it costs. 
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FACTORS AFFECTING BENEFITS VERSUS COSTS 
 Like any model, these benefit-cost results depend upon various assumptions made. 
Varying some assumptions will change benefits versus costs. On the whole, as I will now 
discuss, I suspect that the benefit-cost results in Table 2 are likely to be somewhat over-
optimistic.  
 Among the assumptions that might be changed are: but-for percentage; multiplier; 
employment rate effects; public spending needs; economic effects of spending cuts.  
But-For Percentage 
 Table 2 assumes that without the incentives, none of these 1,500 or 1,800 jobs, or any 
substitutes, would exist in the state. This is an extreme assumption. More realistically, the land 
and infrastructure developed for Foxconn in southeast Wisconsin would find some alternative 
use.  
 To fully ascertain plausible substitute effects would require a detailed economic study of 
plausible alternative uses for the Foxconn site, and possible direct jobs generated. In the absence 
of such a detailed, site-specific study, one could rely on statistical averages. If one enters the 
maximum cost per job incentives into the model, the 1,500 jobs scenario with the old limits used, 
the model says that such incentives would be expected to have a “but for” of 73 percent. That is, 
on average, if one compared one state that offered such incentives to all projects, with another 
state that did not offer such incentives, the job creation in the state that did not offer the 
incentives would be 27 percent as great as the state that did offer the incentives. If we applied 
this statistical average to the 1,500 jobs at the Foxconn project, this implies job creation in 
substitute jobs of about 400 jobs without the incentives. But a site-specific study would give a 
better estimate. 
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Multiplier  
 Various input-output job multipliers have been suggested for the Foxconn project: 2.71 
by EY (2017); 2.39 and 1.93 in two different scenarios for Baker Tilly (2017). For the model 
used to generate Table 2, I somewhat arbitrarily picked the middle multiplier from these three 
choices, that is 2.39. 
 None of these estimated multipliers are fully satisfactory. None of these multipliers, for 
example, is based on a region specific study of the use of Wisconsin versus Illinois suppliers in 
southeast Wisconsin. None of these multipliers relies on empirical data on commuting patterns 
and purchase patterns of workers in southeast Wisconsin and the neighboring region of Illinois. I 
suspect that a more empirically-based multiplier would find more leakages into Illinois than in 
the current multiplier, but how big these extra leakages would be is hard to know without more 
data. 
Employment Rate Effects 
 Both the labor market benefits and fiscal benefits are affected by employment rate 
effects, per job created. The larger the employment rate effects, the larger the labor market 
effects. In addition, the larger the employment rate effects, the lower the population growth 
effects of job growth, and hence a lower impact on spending needs, and thereby higher fiscal 
benefits. 
 The model behind Table 2 implicitly assumes that the Foxconn jobs and the multiplier 
jobs are like “average” jobs. Average jobs that are created in a state’s economy are immediately 
filled by some combination of three sources: hiring already-employed state residents; hiring non-
employed state residents; hiring in-migrants. Jobs filled by hiring already-employed state 
residents results in a new job vacancy, that is filled in the same three ways. Ultimately this 
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vacancy chain is only terminated when all newly created jobs have resulted in some mix of non-
employed state residents being hired, or new residents. Mathematically, an increase in 
employment must either ultimately increase the state’s employment to population ratio, or 
increase its population—there is no ultimate alternative. The relative mix of employment rate 
effects versus population effects depends upon the relative proportions of local non-employed 
versus in-migrants hired along the job vacancy chain.  
 The issue is whether it is proper to treat the Foxconn jobs as “average jobs.” The new 
Foxconn project reportedly will include a high mix of very skilled and very highly-educated 
workers. This raises the odds that for at least the direct jobs created, the vacancy chain will be 
more abruptly terminated by significantly above-average hiring of non-state residents. If so, the 
results in Table 2 overstate the local employment rate benefits, and overstate the fiscal benefits.  
Public Spending Needs 
 The results in Table 2 do not allow for any extraordinary costs for extra needed 
infrastructure from the additional jobs. Implicitly, they assume excess capacity in existing 
infrastructure in southeast Wisconsin. To the extent to which this is untrue, the results in Table 2 
overstate the fiscal benefits of the Foxconn project. Overcoming this limitation of the model 
would require a specific case study of the Foxconn project and of infrastructure conditions and 
needs in southeast Wisconsin. 
 Some of these extra infrastructure costs have already been incurred by local governments 
in southeast Wisconsin. Hence, these are sunk costs and should not be counted in benefit-cost 
analyses moving forward from the present moment. However, there will also be extra 
infrastructure costs associated with expanded population, which are not included in the Table 2 
fiscal analysis.  
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Economic Effects of Spending Cuts 
 The model behind Table 2 assumes that only lower spending on K-12 has any 
productivity effects on the economy. In addition, the model assumes relatively high economic 
benefits to K-12 spending, although benefits consistent with some recent economic studies of 
how K-12 spending affects earnings, specifically the study by Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 
(2015). 
 On the one hand, one could assume lower effects of K-12 spending on Wisconsin 
residents’ earnings than is assumed in the model. On the other hand, other areas of state and local 
public spending might have economic effects on Wisconsin residents, for example funding for 
university and technical colleges, public health, childcare, police and fire, and infrastructure.  
Bottom Line  
 The bottom line is that it seems likely that Table 2 is optimistic. A full evaluation of 
Foxconn with more precise estimates of various economic parameters would probably lower the 
benefit-cost ratio.  
 The most important conclusion of this analysis is that it is difficult to come up with 
plausible assumptions under which a revised Foxconn incentive contract, which offers similar 
credit rates to the original contract, has benefits exceeding costs. The incentives are so costly per 
job that it is hard to see how likely benefits will offset these costs.  
 The project does have a better benefit-cost ratio if the incentive costs are significantly cut 
back. If the state government decides to move ahead with the Foxconn incentives, the details of 
how the Foxconn incentives are limited or capped make a big difference in the project’s net 
benefits.  
 
15 
 
APPENDIX 
 This appendix gives more detail on the incentive costs assumed to generate the different 
Foxconn and Amazon scenarios.  
 The original Foxconn plan incentive payments are directly taken from the November 
2017 agreement between Wisconsin and Foxconn. As mentioned, although the incentives are 
technically paid as a 17 percent wage tax credit for 15 years, and a 15 percent investment tax 
credit, there are various limitations implied in the maximum incentive schedule. In particular, the 
wage payment maximums do not allow for full inflationary adjustment of the initial wages. 
Furthermore, the total investment tax credit is limited to $1.35 billion, which is only 13.5 percent 
of the planned investment of $10 billion. Furthermore, the investment tax credit is paid out over 
seven years. 
 In the reduced Foxconn scenarios, one possibility is that the wage credit will continue to 
be limited to not allowing for full inflation adjustments, and that the maximum investment tax 
credit will be limited to 13.5 percent of $2 billion and allocated evenly across seven years. These 
are the scenarios described as new limits or ratcheted down limits. 
 A second possibility is that the reduced Foxconn scenarios will keep the old annual limits 
and lifetime caps of the original contract, but simply allow the reduced scale project to claim 17 
percent wage credits for 15 years and a 15 percent capital investment tax credit. This scenario 
provides significantly higher incentives than the ratcheted down limits. 
 Table A1 reports all five scenarios from 2018 to 2034. The calculations assume that 
Foxconn’s wages per employee increase with overall price inflation by 2 percent per year from 
2017 until 2034.  
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Table A1  Possible Payments in Millions of Nominal Dollars Under Various Foxconn Deals 
Year 
Original Plan 
1,800 jobs all years, 
new limits 
1,500 jobs all years, 
new limits 
1,800 jobs all years, 
old limits 
1,500 jobs all years, 
old limits 
Jobs 
Jobs 
credit 
Investment 
credit 
Jobs 
credit 
Investment 
credit 
Jobs 
credit 
Investment 
credit 
Jobs 
credit 
Investment 
credit 
Jobs 
credit 
Investment 
credit 
2018 1,040  10 
         
2019 2,080  19 193 
        
2020 5,200  48 193 14 
 
12 
 
17 
 
14 
 
2021 9,100  84 193 14 39 12 39 17 193 15 193 
2022 13,000  120 193 14 39 12 39 18 107 15 107 
2023 13,000  121 193 14 39 12 39 18 
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2024 13,000  121 193 14 39 12 39 19 
 
15 
 
2025 13,000  121 193 14 39 12 39 19 
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2026 13,000  122 
 
14 39 12 39 19 
 
16 
 
2027 13,000  122 
 
14 39 12 39 20 
 
16 
 
2028 13,000  122 
 
14 
 
12 
 
20 
 
17 
 
2029 13,000  122 
 
14 
 
12 
 
20 
 
17 
 
2030 13,000  123 
 
14 
 
12 
 
21 
 
17 
 
2031 13,000  123 
 
14 
 
12 
 
21 
 
18 
 
2032 13,000  124 
 
14 
 
12 
 
22 
 
18 
 
2033 13,000  
  
14 
 
12 
 
22 
 
18 
 
2034 13,000  
  
14 
 
12 
 
23 
 
19 
 
Sum 
(nominal 
dollars) 
— 1,500 1,350 208 270 173 270 297 300 247 300 
Note: All costs are rounded to millions of dollars. Job numbers are actual figures in contract plans.  
 The Amazon scenarios for New York and Virginia are taken directly from the agreements 
between the states and the company. These have different annual scenarios for jobs created and 
payments made. For both state projects, the contracts distinguish between a phase 1, which 
encompasses creating 25,000 jobs, and a phase 2, which goes up to 40,000 jobs (New York) or 
37,850 jobs (Virginia).  Table A2 shows New York, and Table A3 shows Virginia. 
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Table A2  Amazon, New York 
Year Jobs Jobs credits Investment credits 
2019 700 6 35 
2020 2,900 25 30 
2021 5,900 52 42 
2022 7,900 69 28 
2023 11,900 104 55 
2024 15,900 139 55 
2025 17,900 156 28 
2026 20,789 182 40 
2027 23,150 202 33 
2028 25,000 218 26 
2029 26,500 
 
18 
2030 27,750 
 
15 
2031 31,750 
 
48 
2032 35,000 
 
39 
2033 40,000 
 
60 
Total 
 
1,154 551 
NOTE: 2029 on is only if jobs created goes from 25K to 40K. Figures for 
credits are in millions of nominal dollars, unadjusted for inflation. Figures 
for jobs are actual jobs. 
 
 
 
Table A3  Amazon, VA 
Year Total jobs New jobs, phase 1 New jobs phase 2 Phase 1 credits Phase 2 credits 
2019 400 400 
   
2020 1,580 1,180 
   
2021 3,544 1,964 
   
2022 4,983 1,439 
   
2023 7,648 2,665 
   
2024 10,000 2,352 
 
9 
 
2025 11,643 1,643 
 
26 
 
2026 13,850 2,207 
 
43 
 
2027 16,850 3,000 
 
32 
 
2028 19,850 3,000 
 
59 
 
2029 22,155 2,305 
 
52 
 
2030 25,750 2,845 750 36 
 
2031 27,850 
 
2,100 49 
 
2032 31,750 
 
3,900 66 
 
2033 34,850 
 
3,100 66 
 
2034 37,850 
 
3,000 51 
 
2035 37,850 
  
63 12 
2036 37,850 
   
33 
2037 37,850 
   
61 
2038 37,850 
   
48 
2039 37,850 
   
47    
Totals 550 200 
NOTE: Credits are in millions of nominal dollars. Jobs are actual jobs numbers. Phase 1 are new jobs up to 25,000. 
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